By Afshin Yazdani 
Law360 Canada (February 25, 2026, 2:22 PM EST) — Canada’s designation of the Islamic Republic of Iran under s. 35(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) has been expanded to target senior officials serving since June 23, 2003, leading to over 17,800 applications reviewed for potential inadmissibility as of February 2026. This measure aims to bar individuals with senior positions in the Iranian regime from entering or remaining in Canada, resulting in investigations, inadmissibility findings and removals. This article examines the legal framework, enforcement data, procedural processes and remedies, with emphasis on the implications for Iranians holding such positions and facing potential removal.
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Section 35(1)(b) of the IRPA allows Canada to designate regimes engaged in terrorism or gross human rights violations, rendering their senior officials inadmissible. In November 2022, Iran was designated for officials serving from Nov. 15,2019. This was amended in September 2024 to extend retroactively to June 23, 2003, the date of the detention, torture and death of Iranian-Canadian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi. This expansion broadens the net, potentially affecting over 17,800 Iranians with senior regime positions since 2003, including those already in Canada as permanent or temporary residents.
As of February 2026, enforcement has led to significant reviews and actions by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).
Legal framework and scope
Under s. 35(1)(b), senior officials in designated regimes are permanently inadmissible. Iran’s designation now covers senior positions held at any time since June 23, 2003, without requiring proof of direct involvement in abuses.
Senior positions include heads of state or government, cabinet ministers, ambassadors and senior diplomats, high-ranking military, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and intelligence officials, senior public servants and leaders in regime-controlled entities. This broad definition targets Iranians who held influential roles in the regime since 2003, presuming complicity through service. However, judicial interpretation emphasizes that mere rank or title does not suffice to establish seniority; there must be evidence of actual influence over government power, hierarchical proximity to ministers, or the ability to exert personal benefit or operational control from the position. As affirmed in Mazloumiaboukheili v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1629, the legal standard
requires more than nominal rank — it necessitates demonstration of substantial authority or direct involvement in regime functions.
In Mazloumiaboukheili, the Federal Court upheld a finding of inadmissibility for a former chief operations officer of a state-owned Iranian company, noting that his position indicated senior official status due to actual control and hierarchical distance just two levels from a minister, despite claims of lower rank. The ruling stressed the importance of assessing operational control and influence within state-owned or regime-affiliated entities, rather than relying solely on formal titles.
In the context of the Iranian regime designation, which targets those with substantial authority such as heads of state or cabinet members, roles confined to routine mid-level administrative or supervisory duties without policy discretion or proximity to high-level decision-making do not constitute prescribed senior positions. This necessitates evidence of the ability to influence government policy or benefit personally from regime actions. For instance, within the Iranian Law Enforcement Command (NAJA), promotions to ranks like colonel are often routine after 18 to 25 years of service and denote mid-level supervisory roles without strategic influence or policy discretion. Positions involving low- to mid-level administrative, educational or operational tasks — such as training junior staff, processing passport applications, managing military service distributions based on fixed quotas, or handling exemptions and registrations — lack the command authority, involvement in security or intelligence, or discretion that would qualify as senior under s. 16 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR).
In the landmark case Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40, the Supreme Court of Canada established a six-factor test to determine if an individual made a “voluntary, knowing, and significant contribution” to a regime’s crimes. These factors are used by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) to move beyond “guilt by association” and assess individual culpability: (a) the size and nature of the organization, where larger, more diverse organizations make a direct link between an individual’s work and the regime’s crimes less likely, in contrast to organizations whose primary purpose is brutal; (b) the specific part of the organization, focusing on whether the individual worked in a purely civilian or technical branch, such as health care or infrastructure, which may exonerate them even if other branches committed atrocities; (c) duties and activities, examining the actual link between the person’s daily work and the criminal activities, for example, a senior oil executive’s financial contribution might be significant even without personal violence; (d) position or rank, where higher-ranking officials are more likely to have effective control, though rank alone is insufficient without a personal nexus to the criminal purpose; (e) length of time in the position, as extended tenure after awareness of crimes suggests deeper complicity; and (f) recruitment and opportunity to leave, considering voluntary joining and safe resignation options, addressing defences like duress or coercion. These factors are non-exhaustive and highly contextual; not every factor must be met to find someone inadmissible.
The amendment commemorates Zahra Kazemi and addresses long-standing regime abuses, denying safe haven to enablers while supporting Iranian human rights advocates.
Enforcement and potential removals
The CBSA enforces through application reviews, visa cancellations and investigations. For Iranians in
Canada, this can lead to removal proceedings.
Statistics as of June 2026 show over 17,800 applications reviewed for potential inadmissibility under s. 35(1)(b), focusing on those with senior regime positions since 2003, along with 172 investigations opened, 28 inadmissibility reports issued for senior roles, three deportation orders and one removal. These figures illustrate the scale of potential removals, with extensive reviews signalling increased scrutiny of Iranians linked to the regime.
Inadmissibility process
For those in Canada, the process begins with a CBSA investigation that probes evidence of senior positions since 2003; if confirmed, an inadmissibility report is prepared. The matter is then referred to the Immigration and Refugee Board for a hearing and determination. If upheld, a deportation order is issued, imposing a permanent bar. Procedural fairness is maintained through hearings and evidence rights.
Legal remedies
Affected individuals can retain legal counsel to challenge classifications, appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division (for permanent residents), seek Federal Court judicial review, apply for Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) with the 12-month wait waived for Iranians, or request ministerial relief in exceptional cases under s. 42.1(1) of the IRPA. Ministerial relief may be granted if the individual’s presence is not contrary to Canada’s national interest, considering factors such as voluntary disassociation from the regime due to conscientious objection, active opposition through anti-regime activities in Canada, deep family and community ties, and no involvement in the regime’s abuses. These options can delay or prevent removal.
Implications
The policy targets regime insiders but risks affecting dissidents. Judicial scrutiny, per cases like Ezokola v. Canada, may refine applications. It reinforces Canada’s human rights stance but requires balanced enforcement to avoid undue hardship. The principles from Mazloumiaboukheili underscore that inadmissibility findings must be grounded in evidence of actual seniority, such as direct operational responsibility or hierarchical proximity, rather than presuming it from rank alone. This approach ensures that mid-level roles without influence over regime abuses are not captured, aligning with the IRPA’s intent to bar those truly complicit.
Conclusion
The expansion under s. 35(1)(b) has reviewed over 17,800 applications, positioning many Iranians with senior regime roles since 2003 for potential removal. While advancing accountability, it demands robust legal protections.
Afshin Yazdani is barrister, solicitor and founder of YLG Professional Corporation (Yazdani Law Group), headquartered in Toronto, with offices in Vancouver, Los Angeles and the Middle East.
Source: https://www.law360.ca
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